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Active Resistors: The Women of Post-Revolution Iran
Sofia Mouritsen

The idea of Muslim or Middle Eastern women as passive acceptors of discrimination is
unfounded and misleading. Rather, women often actively resist oppression, a phenomenon that is
perhaps increasingly present when a state’s government closely interacts with religion. Despite
this, not all women regard religion as the problem; in fact, many Muslim feminists believe that
Islam can be transformed into an effective solution. However, the feminist discourse is divided
about whether a secular or religious approach is the most effective. Following the 1979 Iranian
Revolution, which culminated in a new government that quickly rescinded many of women’s
rights and protections, Iranian women resisted governmental discrimination but also became
divided over how to overcome it, and they continue to debate the effectiveness of secular and
religious framing today.
Under Ayatollah Khomeini, the leader of the Islamic revolution of 1978-79 and founder
of the Islamic Republic of Iran, discrimination against women blossomed in the years following
the revolution. In the past, Family Protection Laws had protected many of women’s rights,
including a higher marriage age for girls, restrictions on polygamy, and the right to divorce one’s
husband, but Khomeini abolished these laws in 1979 (Moghadam 2002, 1138). He also revoked
women’s rights to serve as judges, segregated certain activities, and made the hijab mandatory
(Sedghi 2007, 201). Hamideh Sedghi suggests that these discriminations were integral in
building a new state identity, specifically one that was “Islamic, anti-imperialist, and antiWesternist” (201). Even if the Iranian people did not agree with Khomeini’s actions, he
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successfully created a fresh image of Iran, and women’s basic protections were slashed in the
name of the new state.
The effects of these actions were deleterious, and the statistics proved it: Within a few
years, fertility was on the rise, rates of female education were spiraling downward, and the
population soared. The value of women seemed to have been increasingly measured in the
amount of children she produced, a traditional view likely rooted in Qur’anic passages exalting
the status of the mother. Women, more illiterate and less educated than before, were
disappearing from the workforce. Valentine Moghadam concludes that these statistics were a
sign that male domination was being reinforced while women’s autonomy was being
compromised (Moghadam 2002, 1138). This certainly seems to be the case. Things looked bleak
for Iranian women.
However, women resisted this discrimination. For example, activists from both secular
and religious orientations demonstrated against the new law making the hijab mandatory: They
wrote articles, held meetings, appealed to international women’s organizations, gave lectures,
and attended rallies (Sedghi 2007, 204). The conservative forces in the government tried to
silence these women, who were forced to go underground, but the movement did not die off. The
liberals in the government were no help either; they chose to ignore gender issues and instead
focus on “nationalism, anti-imperialism, and anti-monarchical tendencies” (205). Despite the fact
that they were on their own, women resisted the idea that their place was in the home, and many
chose to be active in the public sphere, taking advantage of anything that they could still legally
participate in.
Finally, in the 1990’s, the wind shifted. Had the women been successful in resisting?
Partially, but other factors were involved in the reversal of some discriminatory policies.
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Importantly, the death of Khomeini gave women a political opening to have their voices heard.
The new government still believed that a woman’s place was in the home, but it also listened to
some of the demands of women and conceded the importance of women’s involvement in the
professional sphere (Sreberny and Torfeh 2013, 47). However, this was all in the context of a
government that sought economic liberalization and integration into the global economy. Could
Iran’s reversal of some of its sexist policies have simply been a strategy to get the outside world
to look more favorably upon it? This seems likely. The government has proved its willingness to
act strategically before, as in the case of reproductive rights. In early 1990’s, when the
government realized that the population had gotten out of hand, it began promoting birth control
and the notion that a smaller family was a happier and healthier family (Tober 2006, 53-54). The
government acted because it was facing an economic crisis, not because it was sensitive to social
issues and women’s psychological and physical health.
Additionally, the 1980-1988 war with Iraq opened up opportunities for female
employment in the public sector even before Khomeini’s death in 1989. Moghadam notes that
“these jobs went to ideologically correct women, but their very presence suggested both the
determination of women and the flexibility of the Islamic regime” (Moghadam 2002, 1139). But
does it? It seems to suggest the pragmatism of the government above all. It is likely that, because
of the war, the presence of the women in the workforce was necessary. Although women were
allowed to enter the public sector because of a need for professionals, the regime did not unbend
enough to relax its ideological biases; after all, there was still no place in the workforce for
women who disagreed with the government.
Furthermore, although women were not banned from assuming public roles, they were
still discouraged from doing so. This does not indicate the flexibility of the government, either;
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rather, it reinforces the idea of the government’s cautious pragmatism and perhaps its fear of a
“slippery slope”. For example, the government might be concerned that, if women were granted
liberal employment opportunities, they would pour into the workforce and begin to make even
more outrageous demands. However, although the regime’s pragmatism seems to have played a
substantial role in the loosening of employment policies, there is no doubt that women’s
determination also played a role. But how much of an impact did women’s demands for equality
actually have on the regime’s decisions to loosen discriminatory policies?
This is a question that plagues many feminists who seek to understand the best way to
achieve change. Islamic feminists, who advocate for working with the theocratic government,
may point to the improvements that were brought about in the 1980s and 1990s as evidence that
it is possible to work with the government. In addition to the concessions previously mentioned,
these improvements included permission for women to run for parliament and to work in the
civil service (Moghadam 2002, 1139). Islamic feminists might argue that, because these policy
improvements occurred without a radical campaign against the government, there is no need to
completely defy the theocracy. Islamic feminists may believe that their use of a religious frame
will allow them to convince the government to reverse its discriminatory laws. After all, how
could a theocracy reject proposals justified by the same religion that informs its own decisions?
It true that Islamic feminists were important in the successful reversal of some
discriminatory policies. Even Moghadam, a self-described skeptic of the Islamic feminist
movement, attributes the lifting of educational and employment barriers to the “agitation by
activist Islamic women” (Moghadam 2002, 1140). But when considering this, one must recall the
pragmatic nature of the Iranian government. Although barriers against women were lifted at least
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partially by Islamic feminists, does this prove the effectiveness of Islamic feminism? Perhaps
not.
The Islamic feminist argument is based on the idea that the government makes policy
decisions based mainly on its interpretation of Islam, and if women frame their policy demands
using the Qur’an, the government will accept these policies more readily. This argument seems
sound until the first assumption is questioned. What if the government does not make policy
decisions based mainly on its interpretation of Islam? What if the Iranian regime is even more
pragmatic than it appears, and it makes decisions based mainly on economic factors? What if
Islam, instead of being the most important factor in the government’s decisions, is instead used
as a justification and as a way to give the government legitimacy?
Given the government’s history of cautious pragmatism, this is entirely possible. If it is
indeed the case, the Islamic feminists’ argument may be greatly weakened. Let us consider a
hypothetical scenario. If a progressive policy with no economic benefit was proposed by Islamic
feminists, the government could reject it outright, or it could accept the Islamically framed
argument in order to save face and retain its identity as a regime disciplined by Islamic law.
However, the government could also reject the progressive policy because of its lack of
economic benefit and frame its own rejection of the policy using Islam. The many interpretations
of the Qur’an and the authority of the government make this third option very plausible indeed,
since it would allow the regime to dodge an economically detrimental policy while retaining the
legitimacy it is granted by Islam.
Perhaps it was a thought process similar to this that led secular feminists to critique
Islamic feminism and propose their own solutions. Secular feminists believe that, instead of
debating theological interpretations that, in their opinion, will never be resolved anyway, women

5

should focus on using legal and political systems to work towards equality. Secular feminists
would much rather explore socioeconomic and political questions rather than theological ones
(Moghadam 2002, 1158-1160), and they critique the government on the basis of human rights,
international agreements, and a world standard instead of relying on fresh interpretations of the
Qur’an (Sreberny and Torfeh 2103, 53). Is this approach a more effective one?
It is difficult to say. Pressuring the Iranian government by referring to international
agreements could be effective, but only if the other signatories of such agreements had an
economic relationship with Iran and were legitimately committed to human rights. States often
turn a blind eye to some of the less desirable actions of their trade partners, and as a result, many
“minor” human rights violations tend to slide under the global radar. Unless other states were
significantly worried about the actions of Iran, there would not likely be economic repercussions
and therefore no incentive for the government to cooperate with secular feminists.
Still, secular feminists generally believe that they have an edge when it comes to longterm improvements for women. They believe that using Islam to justify feminist demands is
limited and can only lead to minor successes. Secular feminists disparage the efforts of Islamic
feminists as “at best a very limited project and at worst a way of legitimizing the Islamic legal,
political, and moral framework” (Moghadam 2002, 1151). Instead of using the Qur’an as a
source of legitimacy, some feminists prefer to make use of secular ideas. Perhaps by doing this,
these feminists hope to convince the government that women’s rights should be respected simply
because women are human beings, not just because the Qur’an says that mothers deserve respect
or that Muslim women should be protected. After all, what if women can never obtain rights
beyond what is supported by the Qur’an? What if the state only defends the rights of Muslim
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women and ignores religious minorities? All women deserve full rights, so why not set the bar
higher?
To achieve this equality, some feminists call for the use of secular institutions and the
building up of a strong civil society. Many aspire to not only attain equality for women, but to
secure equality for all people, regardless of social, gender, religious, or ethnic differences
(Moghadam 2002, 1160). Some insist that by reaching beyond the limits of Islam, feminists can
make progress toward a more inclusive form of equality. While secular feminists acknowledge
the achievements of Islamic feminists, they maintain that real democratization will “come about
outside of the religious framework” (1151).
But just how will this real democratization materialize? If one works outside the religious
framework, how successful can demands made to a theocratic government ever be? After all,
even if Islam is not the primary informant of the government’s decisions, it still gives the
government legitimacy, and the government is more likely to consider a religiously valid
argument. Furthermore, the ideas of secular feminists might be seen as a product of Western
influence, which would hardly endear them to anti-Western factions within Iran’s government.
This illustrates the difference between a resonant and radical frame, as introduced by Mona
Tajali; according to Tajali, scholars argue that an activist’s demands will resonate more
successfully with elites if the activist takes into account cultural and political contexts (Tajali
2105, 569).
However, secular feminists have adopted a radical frame, not a resonant one. But how
can they ever work with the government, let alone persuade it to make radical changes, if they
ignore cultural and political contexts? The government cannot be bypassed, either; secular
feminists cannot exactly stage a coup, take over the government, and establish a liberal
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democracy. Iran’s government is not going to transform into a Western-style government
anytime soon; this kind of radical change seems very difficult to achieve and may not be
feasible. Why not recognize the gradual nature of change and attempt to work within the stable
system that is already in place?
This is exactly what the Islamic frame does. It does not require radical change, but rather
adopts a resonant style that allows it to quietly work from within the regime. This sort of change
might be slow and ultimately limited, but it is attainable and seems like a good first step in the
advancement of women’s rights. Additionally, it makes more sense to work towards change,
albeit limited change, by bargaining with Iran’s theocracy in the context of its own ideological
language, rather than trying to invalidate its ideology and replace it with a new one for the sake
of rapid and dramatic change, even if dramatic change is a long-term goal.
Tajali identifies Islamic women’s rights activists as strategic, noticing that “they
articulate their demands according to the discursive opportunity structure that best suits their
contexts and furthers their aims” (Tajali 2015, 566). What she means is that, even if a frame does
not perfectly align with their core values, Islamic activists will utilize it if it proves to be more
effective in “garnering support and pressuring political elites” (567). This shows that such
activists are pragmatic, clever, manipulative, and willing to compromise for the sake of progress.
Their main goal is not to do it their way, but rather to identify and adopt the most effective
discursive frame.
This manipulative aspect of Islamic feminism is also reflected in the fact that Islamic
framing reinforces the government’s legitimacy. Although this reinforcement is exactly what
secular feminists dreaded, I believe that the reinforcement of the government’s legitimacy allows
Islamic feminists an opportunity to manipulate the government in a way that secular feminists
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cannot, namely by tapping into the vulnerable masculinity complexes of government leaders and
their corresponding desires to obtain and consolidate power.
The idea of power can be reduced to a few simple assumptions: People who are in power
want to stay in power, people who are not in power want to gain power, and the people in the
former group feel threatened by the ambitious members of the latter group. When it comes to the
power of the men in the Iranian government, their power is two-fold: They have power over the
state and they have power over women. The natural desire to consolidate power informs the men
to be wary of potential challengers; their vulnerable masculinity informs them that that it would
be even more disgraceful for their power to be taken away from them by a woman. This is why
the men use their power to ensure that women do not become potential rivals. As men, they must
dominate above women, and as members of the elite, they must dominate above potential
challengers. To mollify activists and perhaps make themselves look better to international
partners, these men make small concessions to women but will never willingly allow women to
reach a status that threatens their power.
For example, in 2009, the Guardian Council, the all-male, 12-member powerhouse of the
Iranian government—a masculine, powerful elite if there ever was one—declared that women
could run in the upcoming elections. However, the Guardian Council also has the responsibility
to vet potential presidential candidates, and it did not let allow of the 42 women applicants to
progress to the candidacy stage (Sreberny and Torfeh 2013, 53). Even though the President holds
far less power than the Supreme Leader and the Guardian Council, and even though the women
would have had to win an election before reaching the presidency, the Council held tight to its
power, informed by its elitism and masculinity.
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This example is consistent with Tajali’s observation that, even though women are highly
active in politics on behalf of Islamic political movements, they have low levels of political
representation. Despite their hard work on the campaigns of Islamic political parties, women are
given no power once the successful campaign has concluded. Tajali states that “once in power,
the male elites of such parties have often denied women any real power or influence in formal
politics” (Tajali 2015, 564). This situation is a mirror image of the events of the 2009
presidential election, in which threat-sensitive male elites refused politically active women
power.
This is where the Islamic feminist strategy comes in. Instead of making sweeping
demands that threaten the masculine power structure, Islamic feminists recognize the value of
making small demands that are supported by the Qur’an. So long as these demands do not
threaten the power of the male elites, the government is more likely to accept them. Additionally,
the government no doubt feels more secure agreeing to demands that are supported by Islam. In
the government’s eyes, it is acquiescing to demands that align with its own code of law, a code
of law that not only informs but justifies its decisions and legitimizes its power!
Any group of people in power will chafe against demands that could diminish their
authority, and a group of men in power is particularly sensitive to such threats, as history
indicates. Such a group of men is very unlikely to pass any kind of significant legislation that
threatens its power, even if the policy is economically beneficial and especially if the challengers
are women. Powerful male elites will naturally gravitate towards demands that are framed in
their own ideology, appear to respect their power, and even help legitimize it.
Islamic feminism can take advantage of this weakness. By working slowly and patiently,
feminists can unravel some of the discriminations against women. These discriminations will be
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reversed even more readily if the government sees economic benefit in doing so, which indicates
the importance of the combination of a religious and secular frame. The notion of masculinity
and the consolidation of power cannot be ignored, as it is a powerful force and weakness. Why
challenge the government’s power and get nowhere when one can work quietly, accumulating
small concessions that eventually lead to increased power without the government even noticing?
The possibility brings to mind the parable of the frog in water; the temperature of the water
increases so gradually that the frog does not realize it is being boiled to death.
Secular feminists would probably dismiss this logic. After all, what would happen when
the government begins to notice that women have more power? It might stop passing laws
beneficial to women, or it might even take away women’s rights and protections. Additionally,
why should women be content with minor, occasional improvements of their rights? Why should
they have to work with the government? Outright protest is often necessary, and women deserve
to be respected as humans. Tajali also notes that discrimination against women occurs more
often in religiously motivated parties than in their secular counterparts (Tajali 2015, 564), so why
not defeat the Islamic parties and help secular parties gain political control? Then the
government would be more responsive to the advancement of women’s rights. However, even if
a secularly-oriented government was automatically equivalent to a government attentive to
women’s rights, such a political shift is idealistic and unlikely to happen in theocratic Iran. The
concerns of secular feminists are valid and important, but some of their solutions require
dramatic change that is often not feasible.
For their part, secular feminists have their own criticisms of the religious approach. Some
secular feminists believe that attempts at reinterpretation are futile; they believe that the power of
orthodox and fundamentalist ideology, laws, and institutions is too strong for women to
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overcome with liberal religious interpretations (Moghadam 2002, 1150). But this cannot be
entirely true, for the government has shown its ability to make concessions. Whether these
concessions were brought about by economic incentives or Islamic feminist demands is
immaterial; the important takeaway is that there is room for bargaining, if not dramatic change.
Women have been bargaining successfully within patriarchal structures for centuries.
Such bargaining has rarely allowed them to obtain substantial power, but it has allowed them to
reach positions of relative power, even if, as Maryam Poya suggests, Islamic ideology has
reduced women’s bargaining positions (Poya 1999, 17). But should women be content with
bargaining and relative power? They deserve opportunities, respect, jobs, and leadership roles.
On the other hand, can these goals be achieved if one bypasses patriarchal bargaining, or is
bargaining and the gradual accumulation of relative power a necessary stepping stone to full
equality?
There are no conclusive answers to these questions. Feminists in Iran and elsewhere
grapple constantly with the benefits and drawbacks of secular or religious approaches, and they
remain divided over which frame is more effective. Despite all of their differences, however,
these women have something in common: They are all active resistors of discrimination. Instead
of quietly accepting their fate after the revolution, women protested and became activists. In the
end, these women have the same fundamental goal, even if they disagree on how to reach it.
Regardless of whether a woman prefers the secular or religious frame, whether or not she is a
Muslim, or whether she wants to enter the public sphere or stay home and raise a family, all of
these feminists want to protect and expand the rights of women.
There is an old and hostile division between secular and Islamic feminists, but some
women have realized the importance of coming together. Rather than arguing about which frame
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is better, women should focus on taking advantage of the benefits of both frames. What if
women presented the government with a proposal that was not only supported by the Qur’an but
also referenced international agreements and economic incentives? What if women put pressure
on the government in multiple areas at once, fighting cleverly and relentlessly for their rights? If
secular and Islamic feminists considered each other’s critiques and modified and combined their
strategies, they could form one powerful resistance.
The years directly following the Iranian Revolution were oppressive to women, but
women, both secular and religious, resisted. Eventually, they did reverse many discriminatory
policies, sometimes because the government bowed to their resistance, sometimes because of
leadership changes, and sometimes because economic incentives happened to align with
women’s demands. Women continue to resist today by criticizing the low number of women in
decision-making positions, opposing sexism and discriminatory bills, and working to mobilize
civil society (Sreberny and Torfeh 2013, 53). The momentum of this resistance seems
unstoppable, and it could become even more powerful if secular and religious feminists
combined their efforts. Whether women call for the reversal of discriminatory bills, advocate for
better representation, or urge the government to remove sexist barriers, the women’s rights
movement will be more powerful if feminists work together. As the oppressed minority fighting
against a powerful male elite, secular and religious feminists must unite; when this is
accomplished, Iranian women will have built a very formidable resistance indeed.
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